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ABSTRACT
FAULT TREE BASED RISK ANALYSIS OF A TRANSMISSION BASED LASER 
SENSOR FOR INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM APPLICATIONS
Name: Das, Arobindu
University of Dayton
Advisor: Dr. Mashrur A. Chowdhury
With the increased difficulty -social, political, and economic - of expanding 
transportation capacity through conventional infrastructure- building and with the 
increase of transportation demand and congestion, Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS) is increasingly considered as a better solution to these problems. 
Successful operation of ITS application often depends upon the deployment of 
traffic sensors at various strategic locations on transportation facilities.
The objectives of this research were to develop a laboratory prototype of a 
reliable transmission-based laser sensor system that would measure the traffic 
flow parameters and to estimate the sensor system’s probability of failure, using 
fault tree analysis, under various adverse weather conditions, such as fog,
smoke and rain.
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Though an attempt had been made to assess the probability of failure under 
adverse weather conditions, it was very difficult to create a laboratory condition 
that would give the failure probability exclusively for each event. Recent studies
related to the various weather conditions had been consulted for the estimation
of the system’s failure.
The estimated failure probability of the system was 1.966 % giving the 
system’s reliability as 98.034 %. Inclusion of redundancy and more powerful 
laser diode and photo detector pairs would increase the system’s reliabili
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Every year billions of dollars are invested in the US for the construction of new, 
or expansion of existing, transportation facilities to accommodate more 
automobiles and trucks to ensure fast and safe movement of people and goods. 
However, the congestion level and travel delay is also increasing every year. 
Construction can not keep pace with the transportation needs. Motorists drive 
approximately 2.6 trillion miles each year, which is 80 percent more than they did 
20 years ago according to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) estimation 
(Sundeen 2002). Another estimation of FHWA states that the total number of 
drivers has increased by 30 percent since 1980 and it will continue at a rate 
faster than the overall population growth (Sundeen 2002).
The 225 percent increase of truck travel during the last 30 years has added 
more traffic on road networks and official prediction is that the rate of truck travel 
will grow 3 percent annually in the next 20 years, nearly doubling the number of
trucks on the road.
Increased traffic congestion as more cars and trucks come on to the existing 
roads results in a huge traffic delay nationally, which is roughly 4.4 billion hours
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according to the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) estimation 
(http://mobility.tamu.edu.ums).
The costs due to travel delay rose to $78 billion in 1999 in many urban areas, 
which was far bigger than the $21 billion in 1982 according to TTI. Also, the huge 
amount of traffic on roads is one of the many reasons for the increase of highway 
deaths, which was 43,000 in 2003(ITE journal, July 2004).
The traditional approach of building new transportation facilities or adding to 
the existing ones to mitigate the congestion problem and to accommodate the 
increased traffic is a less appealing solution to transportation planners due to 
budget, expense, time and environmental challenges. Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS) refers to the integrated application of traffic engineering concepts, 
software, hardware, and communications technologies to the surface 
transportation system to improve its efficiency and safety (Chowdhury 2003).
Problem Statement
Keeping the traffic flowing does not guarantee future mobility and meeting 
future traffic demand. Mobility and demand satisfaction should include the 
impacts of congestion and travel time on the economy, air pollution, noise 
emission and many other areas. ITS is expected to be a solution to help alleviate 
these problems. To solve the congestion problem, transportation professionals 
need a clear picture of the traffic flow which depends largely on the availability of 
real time traffic data not only at the strategic locations but on the network as a 
whole. The most important parameters are vehicle count, average speed within a
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time interval, and the classification of vehicles. Traffic detectors measure all of 
these necessary parameters to support several ITS functions such as traffic 
signal control, ramp metering, traveler information development, and freeway 
management and incident detection.
Though the emergence of numerous technologies in the development of 
different kinds of traffic detectors over the years, it is clear that traffic detection 
systems are comprised of four components, namely detection methods, 
hardware, software and communications. Based on the technology used, the 
detection method can be either intrusive to the roadway such as inductive loops 
or non-intrusive such as laser-based systems, closed-circuit cameras, probe 
vehicles, media, and police and citizen reports. Detection methods also 
sometimes use environmental sensors to get information about the weather in 
some particular time period. Conversion of collected raw data into meaningful 
traffic parameters by using algorithms and communication with field devices 
through graphical user interface is done by computer software. Finally, the 
communication system integrates the different components of the control center 
and provides the links between the control center and the field devices. Current 
detector technologies can be classified as either intrusive to the roadway or non- 
intrusive. The examples of intrusive detectors are inductive loop, magnetometer 
and magnetic detectors, whereas non-intrusive detectors are microwave radar, 
laser sensors, ultrasonics, acoustics and video image processing.
The inductive loop detectors (ILDs) are the most primitive and the most 
often used traffic sensors in transportation system management since 1960. ILDs
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working principle is based on the decrease in loop inductance due to the two 
opposing magnetic fields. One of them is the loop’s magnetic field caused by the 
loop’s current and the other one is the eddy current’s magnetic field which 
opposes the loop’s magnetic field. The eddy current is induced from the vehicle 
residing on the loop. The quality of the basic traffic parameters such as volume, 
presence, occupancy, speed and gap obtained from loop detectors under 
favorable weather conditions is good enough but at high expense of installation, 
maintenance and electronic processing. Moreover, the requirement of closing 
lanes and re-routing traffic during its installation causes disturbance especially in 
highly dense traffic areas. In addition to the above disadvantages, ILDs 
intrusiveness makes it unsuitable for some locations such as bridges. ILDs are 
sensitive to stress and temperature. Besides these issues, the foremost problem 
with ILDs is their reliability. Because of their susceptibility to stress, the ILD 
failure rate is quite high which is in the range of 0.13 to 0.29 per detector per year 
(Lawrence A. Klein, Sensor Technologies and Data Requirements for ITS, pp- 
287). The estimate of failure rate includes both the structural and detection 
failure. Pavement cracks and separation from bottom up or routine maintenance 
involving removal of few inches of asphalt from where the loop is installed mainly 
cause the structural failure of ILDs. Due to these reasons, transportation 
agencies have searched for an effective and inexpensive detection system that 
can be installed and maintained with minimal disruption of traffic while not 
sacrificing the reliability and accuracy of the data they depend upon. As a result 
of their search, non-intrusive detection systems were developed.
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To quantify the level of uncertainties with loop detector observations a fuzzy- 
clustering approach has been developed recently (Ishak 2003) which can help 
data screening, detector maintenance and re-calibration processes. Although the 
uncertainty measurement could help identify the operational status and 
calibration problems and improve the accuracy of the sensor data, their 
intrusiveness may exclude the possibility of their selection in future transportation 
systems.
Two-axis fluxgate magnetometer and magnetic detectors (ITE 1990) are two 
other types of intrusive detectors. The essential part of the magnetometer is the 
probe embedded in the pavement connected by wire to the pullbox and 
controller. A quarter of an inch wide and one-inch deep single sawcut that runs 
across the entire width of the road contains the wire. The probes are placed in
one-inch diameter cores in the middle of each directional lane. Detectable
voltage change caused by a vehicle passing over the probe sends a signal to the 
controller. The installation requires pavement cut as does the ILDs. This type of 
detector cannot perform vehicle classification tasks (Klein 2001).
Magnetic detectors detect the vehicle signature by measuring the distortion in 
the magnetic flux lines induced by the perturbations in the quiescent earth’s 
magnetic field due to the movement of the metal vehicle. Similar to the loop 
detectors, the installation requires pavement cut or tunneling under the roadway. 
Without special layout and signal processing software, this type of detector is not 
able to detect stopped vehicles (ITE 2000). Magnetic detectors also cannot 
classify vehicles (Klein 2001).
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Pressure pad detection is activated by the weight of a vehicle closing the 
connection between a contact plate and the connecting cable to the controller. 
The closed circuit then sends a signal to the controller. The pressure detector is 
limited in application due to its high expense and its inability to collect all 
necessary traffic data except traffic count. This is also an intrusive detector.
An intrusive detector’s susceptibility to structural failure, including pavement 
cracks, and during routine maintenance involving the removal of the top few 
inches of asphalt from the place where loop is installed and the lane closure 
requirement during installation make transportation system management 
agencies seer for an effective and inexpensive detection system that can be 
installed and maintained with minimal disruption of traffic. From the outcome of 
the search for an alternative detection system emerges the non-intrusive
detection device. Non-intrusive detection devices are not embedded in
pavement; instead, they are mounted on a structure over or to the side of the
road.
Microwave radar detectors are non-intrusive detectors and their installation
does not require pavement cut. Microwave detectors perform well in all weather 
conditions as they are not sensitive to weather conditions but their main 
disadvantage is that they can’t detect stopped vehicles. There are two types of 
microwave radar detectors based on their transmitted electromagnetic wave. As 
these types of detectors are installed above ground surface they are not subject 
to the effects of ice and plowing activities. Microwave radars have shown
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acceptable performance in inclement weather conditions such as rain, snow, fog 
and wind (klein 2001).
Another non-intrusive detector device is the infrared sensor, which usually 
employs laser diodes and in certain cases (active type) light emitting diodes 
(LEDs). Both the laser diodes and LEDs operate in the near infrared spectrum. 
Infrared sensors are of two kinds: active detectors and passive detectors (FHWA 
2000). Active infrared sensors have similarity to microwave radar detectors as 
both of them transmit a narrow beam of energy towards a roadway surface. The 
detection technique is based on the reflected beam from the vehicle presence in 
the detection zone. Though there is no commercial model of active infrared 
sensor in the US market, which employs LED as the energy source, there exists 
one prototype sensor system based on two transmitter receiver systems and 
modulated LEDs to measure speed and height of trucks. Modulated signal 
prevents interference from other sources transmitting infrared energy. Active 
infrared sensors transmit multiple beams within a detection zone to measure 
traffic parameters like volume, lane occupancy, speed, length assessment, 
queue measurement and classification. The main disadvantage is degradation of 
performance in certain weather condition such as fog or snow (Klein 2001).
Passive infrared sensors do not emit energy; rather, they detect energy, which 
is emitted or reflected from vehicles, road surfaces, and other objects. Energy 
sensitive detection elements on the focal plane of non-imaging infrared passive 
sensors gather energy from the entire scene. Passive infrared sensors with a 
single detection zone can measure volume and lane occupancy whereas those
7
with multiple detection zones can measure speed and length. Degradation of 
performance in adverse weather condition such as sunlight, fog, haze, snow, 
smoke and dust is one of several disadvantages of these types of sensors.
Pressure waves of sound energy above human audible range are transmitted 
and the reflected energy towards the sensor is detected in Ultrasonic non- 
intrusive sensors. Pulse waveform is generally used in most of the models. They 
are capable of providing vehicle count, presence and lane occupancy. Moreover 
these types of detectors are able to serve multiple lanes and can detect over­
height vehicles. Environmental conditions like temperature and air turbulence 
affect their performance.
The interaction of a vehicle’s tires with the road surface and the variety of 
sounds from a vehicle in traffic generate acoustic energy or audible sound, 
detection of which by an acoustic detector gives the detector’s capability of 
measuring speed, volume, occupancy and presence. Acoustic detectors use a 
system of microphones to pick up the generated sounds from a focused area 
near a lane or a roadway. A signal-processing algorithm can detect the increase 
in sound energy due to the passage of a vehicle through the detection zone and 
a vehicle presence signal is initiated. The vehicle presence signal is terminated 
when the sound energy in the detection zone drops below the detection threshold 
as the vehicle leaves the detection zone. The acoustic sensor’s ability to work in 
all light conditions and during adverse weather gives an advantage position 
compared to other detector technologies.
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The transportation community had considered video detectors as their choice 
of detection devices due to their capabilities of monitoring multiple lanes and 
providing wide area detection. However their performance was degraded in 
inclement weather conditions such as fog, snow, rain, day-to-night transition, and 
glare at dawn and dusk. The traffic count by this type of detector missed 
tailgaters according to a study (Habina 2002). Another study found that parallax 
error, a distance- related measurement error, occurred in the video detector as it 
had to rely on field of view for its measurement reading and could cause 10 to 50 
percent erroneous data on a normal camera setup (Tian and et.al 2002).
The U.S. transportation community has not accepted any particular detector, 
as its most preferred one because of the disadvantages associated with available 
systems. An infrared sensor could be a simple and cost-effective tool to assess 
traffic flow parameters. The proposals of other researchers involving infrared 
detectors were based on the reflection of the signals, which required a long 
distance of propagation and might cause excessive attenuation, diffraction, and 
scattering of the signal. The developed infrared sensor was transmission based 
rather than reflection based and provided reliable estimates of vehicle position, 
speed and classification, and it did not need to rely on proper aiming of a laser 
beam to get good reflection. The laboratory prototype of the new sensor was 
modeled by fault tree analysis to check the detector’s robustness under various 
unfavorable conditions, which might cause failure of the detector in field. As a 
result, the developed system was able to alleviate the problems associated with 
infrared sensor deployments and was a simple and convenient tool to support
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managing freeway operations, traffic signal operation, ramp metering, work zone 
traffic monitoring and traveler information system development.
Objectives
The general objective of this research was to develop and evaluate a reliable 
transmission-based laser sensor using fault-tree analysis, and to refine the 
system design.
Literature Review
Previous research on the transmission-based laser sensor system and 
performances in various inclement weather conditions are discussed in this 
section. A field prototype based on laser-based non-intrusive detection method 
was tested at the University of California, Davis (Cheng, et al, 2001). This 
prototype was capable of measuring the delineations of moving vehicles. Vehicle 
speed was measured with the help of two laser transmitter/detector pairs 
installed at a known distance apart. The test results validated the detection 
method and the algorithm used in the prototype. The sensor system was able to 
measure velocity, acceleration and vehicle length traffic parameters.
Evaluation of the operation of overhead infrared laser sensors under heavy
traffic and adverse weather condition was done at New York toll booths
(Tropartz, et al, 1999). About 2.3 million vehicle classifications were made with 
an accuracy of 98.5%. This sensor system was developed using passive
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technology which collects reflected light from the pavement into a photodiode 
and the absence of the reflected light meant vehicle presence.
Research by Harlow et al (1997) used a laser sensor system that returned 
range and intensity image information. This information was used to classify 
vehicle parameters such as vehicle's length, width, height and speed. In this 
study a series of known vector lengths and projecting lasers at various pre­
determined angles were used to classify vehicles such as automobile, van, 
pickup-truck or sports utility vehicle by differences in their heights above the 
roadway in relationship to their measured length. The algorithm used in this study 
considered additional features on the back of the vehicle on the assumption that 
the rear area of a vehicle varies considerably by vehicle type. Harlow used range 
imagery laser sensors and had a classification accuracy of over 92%.
Attenuation of optical lasers in the visible and IR region due to fog was 
studied by Maher, et al (2004). This study focused on the disturbing role of 
atmosphere on light propagation and thus on the channel capacity, availability 
and link reliability. Light propagation through the atmosphere is affected at the 
same time by absorption and scattering caused by atmospheric constituents 
(molecules and aerosols).These scattering and absorption cause the loss of a 
part of the transmitted power of light, called attenuation. The power loss of light is 
exponential in nature with the distance from the source of light in such a manner 
that can be described as the ratio of received power at a distance L to the 
emitted power called total transmittance of the atmosphere and it is wavelength 
dependent. Total transmittance is a function of distance from light source L and a
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coefficient called attenuation or total extinction. Total transmittance is a number
that can be calculated as the transcendental number; e raised to a power equal 
the negative of multiplication result of extinction coefficient and the distance from 
the light source. To know the received power at a distance L from the source, 
extinction coefficient needs to be determined. In this study it is the extinction 
coefficient (due to fog) that was determined from both an empirical and 
theoretical point of view in the visible and IR regions. The authors classified fog 
based on their visibilities and found that for dense fog (visibility < 500 m) the 
wavelength of the light in IR and visible region and the particle size of fog was of 
same order causing Mie scattering. Finally the authors modeled fog of different 
visibilities with a computer program (FASCOD) and developed graphs of 
extinction coefficients vs. wavelength of light for each fog of a certain visibility. In 
this study both advection and radiation fog were considered. From these graphs 
for a light of known wavelength, a visibility extinction coefficient can be 
determined which helps calculating the light attenuation at a known distance L.
Attenuation of IR light waves caused by rainfall while it propagates through the 
atmosphere was studied by Maha (2004). Due to the larger drop size of rain than 
the wavelength of IR light, rainfall causes non-selective scattering which is 
wavelength independent. Like fog attenuation, rainfall attenuation is also 
composed of absorption and scattering components of which absorption is 
negligible as the most abundant gases (nitrogen and oxygen) do not have any 
absorption bands in this wavelength. Rainfall attenuation is mainly caused by 
scattering of light by rain droplets. Unlike attenuation due to fog where limited
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visibility is the main reason of attenuation, attenuation due to rain is based upon 
rainfall rate, relative humidity and temperature. In estimating the scattering 
coefficient a simulation had been done using Simulight software. Rainfall drop 
size distribution was approximated by Weibull distribution and a plot of rainfall
attenuation coefficient vs. rainfall rate had been drawn to calculate the
attenuation for any rainfall rate.
Scope
This research focused on the development of a reliable transmission-based 
laser sensor for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) application. As light 
propagation through atmosphere could attenuate in adverse weather such as fog 
or rain, the performance of a laser sensor could also be deteriorated significantly. 
To develop a reliable sensor, a prototype of the sensor was modeled in the 
laboratory and its failure probability has been estimated under adverse weather
conditions.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL CONCEPT
Traffic flow consists of interacting individual drivers and vehicles and other 
geographical and physical elements of the roadway. As all of these can vary 
widely, dealing with traffic streams involves an element of variability. Description 
of traffic stream quantitatively requires understanding of this inherent variability 
and also knowledge of normal ranges of these parameters. The subsection 
“Measurement of Traffic Flow Parameters” describes the parameters most often 
used for this purpose that constitute a language with which traffic streams are 
described and understood. The theory of fault-tree analysis is explained in the 
subsection “Overview of Fault-Tree Analysis” while the subsection “Prototype 
Development” details the methodology used in the prototype development and 
this subsection also explains hardware and software of the prototype
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Measurement of Traffic Flow Parameters
A traffic stream is described quantitatively with the three basic elements -flow, 
speed and density. Density is also related to the gap or headway between two 
vehicles in the traffic stream. A brief definition of these terms is given below:
Flow (q). Flow can be defined as the number of vehicles passing a given point 
on a highway during a given period of time, typically 1 hour (vehicles per hour). 
Speed (u).Speed is the distance traveled by a vehicle during a unit of time. 
Speed is usually expressed in miles per hour, kilometers per hour or feet per
second.
Density (k). Traffic density can be defined as the number of vehicles present 
over a unit length of a highway at a given instant in time. Density can be 
measured indirectly by dividing measured traffic flow (vehicles per hour per lane) 
by speed (miles per hour).
In this research flow, speed and also the size of the passing vehicle were 
measured with the developed prototype.
Overview of Fault -Tree Analysis
This section describes the basic concepts, construction procedure and 
evaluation techniques of fault tree analysis necessary to analyze a system’s risk. 
Before going in to the detail of fault tree related issues it is important to argue the
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justification of analyzing a system from a pessimistic view i.e. “failure” rather than 
from optimistic view of ’’success”. The operation of a system can be perceived 
from two different standpoints: the ways it can succeed or the ways it can fail. 
Failure/success space is depicted in Figure 1 below.
MINIMUM
ACCEPTABLE
SUCCESS
MINIMUM
ANTICIPATED
SUCCESS
MAXIMUM
ANTICIPATED
SUCCESS
TOTAL
SUCCESS
COMPLETE
FAILURE
MAXIMUM
TOLERABLE
FAILURE
MAXIMUM
ANTICIPATED
FAILURE
MINIMUM
ANTICIPATED
FAILURE
Figure 1: The Failure Space-Success Space Concept. (Fault Tree Hand Book 
1981)
A plane that has the capability of flying high for a long distance without 
refueling with a high speed is desirable and would be an ideal one. But the final 
design of the plane will definitely fall short of some of its ideal characteristics due 
to trade-offs, which is always the case in real world. The “success” of the plane 
can have different meaning to different people but if it crashes, everybody will 
say the system failed.
The “success” parameters of a system such as output, efficiency, production 
and marketing features are not easy to model by simple discrete events, such as 
“valve does not open” which characterizes failure space. This event “failure”,
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particularly “complete failure” is easy to define, whereas the “success” event is 
not as easy to define and that is why analysis is done in failure space.
Another argument in favor of failure analysis is that although both the number 
of ways a system can fail or succeed is not finite, the number of ways for the 
success space is more than that of in the failure space. Consideration of failure 
space helps analysts to complete their task which otherwise would not be 
completed. The tree diagram for a large, complex system is very large and if the 
failure space were considered, only two or three trees would be enough to cover 
all the possible failures of the system whereas consideration of the success 
space would require several hundreds of trees. As an example, analysis of the 
Minuteman Missile system can be mentioned in which three fault trees were 
done. Careful analysis of these three trees covered the whole complex system.
The selection of an undesired event is the most important factor as it 
determines the success or failure of a fault tree analysis. The undesired event 
will be the top event in a fault tree diagram constructed for the system. 
Generally, it consists of complete, catastrophic failure. The undesired event 
should be carefully chosen, as if it is too general then the tree will be 
unmanageably large. On the other hand, a too-specific undesired event cannot 
give a broad view of the system. To get a clear idea about the selection of a top 
event, consider the different possible events that Mr.”X” can encounter on his 
driving to his office from home, which is depicted in the Figure 2.
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COMPLETE FAILURE
Maximum Tolerable Failure
Maximum Anticipated Failure
Accident(Death or crippling injury)
Accident (Car damaged; No personal injury) 
Minor Accident 
Flat Tire
Windshield wipers inoperative(Heavy rain) 
Traffic jam 
Arrives at 9:00
Windshield wipers inoperative (Light Rain)
Minimum Anticipated Failure
Traffic Congestion 
Arrives at 8:45
TOTAL SUCCESS ◄
Lost hubcap
Windshield wipers inoperative(clear weather)
> Arrives at 8:30(No difficulties whatsoever)
Figure 2: Use of Failure Space in Transport Example (Fault Tree Hand 
Book 1981)
Figure 2 presents “accident that causes death or serious injury” as complete 
failure, which will be the top event of a fault tree if constructed for his driving
mission.
Basic Elements of a Fault Tree
A fault tree is a graphical representation of the faults. It shows the various 
parallel and sequential combinations of those faults, which result in the 
predefined undesired event. The faults can be the events that are associated 
with component hardware failures, human errors, or any other events which can
lead to the considered event.
18
A fault tree is not a model of all possible system failures or all possible causes 
of system failure. It consists of a top event, which is a particular system failure 
mode and all possible faults that cause the top event. A fault tree is a qualitative 
and quantitative model and composed of entities known as “gates”. Gates give 
permission or inhibit the passage of a fault to go up the tree. It gives the 
relationship of the events needed to occur for the” higher” event. The higher 
event is the “output” of the gate; and lower ones are the “input”. A typical fault 
tree is composed of several symbols that are summarized below in the table 1.
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PRIMARY EVENT SYMBOLS
o
o
BASIC EVENT - A basic initiating fault requiring no further 
development.
CONDITIONING EVENT - Specific conditions 
or restrictions
0
UNDEVELOPED EVENT - An event which is not 
further developed either because it is of insufficient 
consequences or information unavailable.
EXTERNAL EVENT - An event which is not further developed 
either because it is of insufficient consequences or information 
unavailable.
INTERMEDIATE EVENT SYMBOLS
INTERMEDIATE EVENT - A fault event that occurs because of one or more 
antecedent causes acting through logic gates.
GATE SYMBOLS
OR- Ouptut fault occurs if at least one of the inputs faults occurs.
AND - Output fault occurs if all the input fault occurs.
EXCLUSIVE OR- Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults 
occurs.
PRIORITY AND -Output faults occurs if all of the input faults occur in a 
specific sequence (the sequence is represented by a CONDITIONING EVENT 
drawn to the right of the gate.
INHIBIT- Output fault occurs if the (single) input fault occurs in the 
presence of an enabling condition.
Tablel: Symbols used in Fault Tree (Fault Tree hand book 1981)
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Principle of Fault-Tree Construction
After introducing the symbols used to build a fault tree, the concepts 
needed to select and define fault tree events will be discussed. Concepts such as 
fault vs. failure, passive vs. active components, different component failures and 
relationship among their effects, failure modes, failure mechanisms and failure 
effect necessary in determining interrelationship among events, and also the 
immediate cause of a higher event to go a level deeper in the fault tree building 
process will be discussed in this section.
Faults vs. Failures. “Failure” is a specific word whereas “fault” is a more general 
word. Using an example will help better understand the distinction between them. 
Consider the working principle of a clothes dryer machine which is supposed to 
shut down after the cycle completes and the user opens the door to take out the 
dry clothes. But if the user opens the door before the cycle completes, then the 
machine will shut down and the clothes will not dry. The event is not a failure as it 
is supposed to shut down on door opening which it exactly does. In this system 
the user is a part of the system and it is his/her untimely action that causes the 
“fault” event. Both time “when” the undesirable state of the component happens 
and “what” is the undesirable state are need to be specified in the description of
a fault event in the fault tree.
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Passive vs. Active Components. Components of a system can be classified as 
“active” and “passive” based on the way they change the functionality of the 
system. Passive components provide functionality to a system in a static way 
while active components are more dynamic. As an example, consider a computer 
network which consists of hosts such as source and destination; and a 
transmission medium such as wire or radio. In this system, source host transmits 
data (signal) to the destination host through transmission media. The main 
function of the transmission media is to carry the data from the source to 
destination, but it cannot originate any data and thus it is a passive component of 
the system; whereas, source and destination hosts are active components, as 
they can originate data. The failure of a passive component causes non­
transmission (static) of the signal whereas failure of active component produces 
no data at all or incorrect data (dynamic behavior).
Component Fault Categories: Primary, Secondary, and Command. If a fault of a 
component occurs in an environment for which it was designed then it is called a 
primary fault. For example a bridge girder designed to withstand a load P fails at
a load which is smaller than P.
A secondary fault is any fault of a component that occurs in an environment 
for which it was not designed. If in the previous example the girder fails at a load 
greater than P then a secondary fault has occurred.
As primary and secondary faults are normally component failures, they are 
usually called primary and secondary failures. On the other hand command fault
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occurs at the proper operation of a component but at the wrong time as in the 
dryer example given in the “Faults vs. Failure” section.
Failure Mechanism, Failure Mode and Failure Effect. Determination of the proper 
interrelationships among the events of a fault tree requires the basic concepts of 
failure effects, failure modes and failure mechanisms. Failure effects explain the 
importance of a particular failure and its effects on the system. Failure modes 
show what aspects of component failures are of concern. How a particular failure 
mode can occur and also, perhaps, what is the corresponding probability of it 
happening, are described by failure mechanisms. Thus, failure mechanisms 
produce failure modes which, in turn, have certain effects on system operation. 
These failure modes constitute the various types of system failures and in the 
fault tree terminology these are the “top events” that the system analyst can 
consider. The number of fault trees that a system can have depends on the 
number of failure modes a system analyst considers and for each of the chosen
failure modes in the fault tree.
In analyzing the system failure a system analyst will take one of these top
events and define immediate reasons for its occurrence. These immediate
reasons are the failure mechanisms for the top event and constitute the second 
level of the fault tree rooted at the top event. This second level (failure 
mechanisms just identified) actually constitutes the failure modes of the 
subsystems and will be the failures of the certain subsystem in the same way as 
the root was for the whole system. Immediate causes of these failures will
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constitute the third level of the tree and analysis will proceed in this way until the 
component failures are reached. These component failures are the basic causes 
and are defined by the resolution of the tree. All the subsystem and system 
failures above the component level are failure effects from the point of view of an 
analyst at component level - that is, they represent the results of particular 
component failures.
The “Immediate Cause” Concept. The “immediate cause” concept helps in 
analyzing a system thoroughly and completely so that no event can be dropped 
from consideration. In the fault tree analysis of a system, a system analyst will 
define his system boundary first and then select a particular system failure mode 
for analysis. This system failure mode will be the top event of the fault tree. The 
immediate, necessary and sufficient causes for the occurrence of this top event
will constitute the second level of the tree. These immediate causes should be
determined by analyzing the system methodically one-step-at-a-time so that no 
event can be missed from consideration of the immediate causes of the top 
event. Due to this methodical incremental analysis, the “immediate cause” 
concept is sometimes called the “Think Small” Rule.
The immediate, necessary and sufficient causes of the top event are now 
viewed as sub-top events which will be the top events of the subsystems and 
their immediate, necessary and sufficient causes will be determined in the same 
way as before. In doing this system analyst will view the part of the system which
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are subsystems of the whole system and for which the failure modes (immediate 
causes) are the failure mechanisms of the whole system.
Proceeding in this way down the tree by continuously changing point of view 
from mechanism to mode, a system analyst approaches finer resolution in 
mechanisms and modes until the preset limit of resolution of the tree is reached. 
The limit is set at component failures and as the inclusion of every possible event 
is guaranteed by following the immediate cause concept in every step of the 
analysis, the constructed tree will include all events and failures, and by analysis 
of this tree will give a good estimate of the probability of occurrence of the top 
event, i.e. system failure.
Basic Rules for Fault Tree Construction. Though fault tree construction was 
initially considered as an art, now it is well accepted that a successful tree can be
drawn with a set of basic rules described below.
Ground Rule I: “Write the statements that are entered in the event boxes as
faults; state precisely what the fault is and when it occurs.”
Ground Rule II: “If the answer to the question” Can this fault consist of a 
component failure?” is “Yes,” classify the event as a “state-of-component fault.” If 
the answer is “No”, classify the event as a “state-of-system fault.”
For the “state-of-component fault” an OR-gate below the event is added and 
primary, secondary and command modes are sought where as for the “state-of- 
system fault” any of AND-gate, OR-gate, INHIBIT-gate or no gate is necessary.
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Minimum necessary and sufficient immediate cause or causes are looked for in 
the ”state-of-system” fault.
There are three other procedural rules in addition to the above ground rules. 
The first of these is the NO Miracles Rule:” If the normal functioning of a 
component propagates a fault sequence, then it is assumed that the component 
functions normally.” The remaining two procedural rules deal with the dangers of 
not being methodical in the development of fault tree. The first one is Complete - 
the -Gate Rule:" All inputs to a particular gate should be completely defined 
before further analysis of any one of them is undertaken.” The second one is the 
No Gate-to-Gate Rule:“Gate inputs should be properly defined fault events, and 
gates should not be directly connected to other gates.”
Fault-tree Evaluation
Once a fault-tree is considered, it is evaluated to get the qualitative and/or 
quantitative results from it. Evaluation can be done either by manually (small 
tree) or by computer codes (large tree). In this study only quantitative results 
were investigated, by which the absolute value of the failure probability of the top 
event was calculated manually. Calculation of the probability of the failure of the 
top event was a two-step procedure; the first was to express the top event in 
terms of the minimal cut sets, and the second was to calculate the probability of 
failures of the components that were in the minimal cut set expression of the top 
event. For the first step, the fault tree was represented in terms of Boolean
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equations. These equations were then used to determine the fault tree’s 
“minimal cut sets”. Minimal cut sets defined the” failure modes” of the top event 
and helped quantify the fault tree. In this section the method of representing the 
top event of a fault tree in terms of a minimal cut set is explained generally and 
the application of this method to the fault tree of the sensor system is explained
in the section “Evaluate the fault-tree of the sensor to assess risk of failure”.
Minimal Cut Sets. A minimal cut set is defined as a smallest combination of
component failures which, if all occur, will cause the top event to occur”. A 
minimal cut set is a “smallest” combination of primary events sufficient for the top 
event to occur and if one of the failures in the cut set does not occur, then top 
event will not occur. The minimal cut set expression for the top event can be 
written in the general form.T = Mi + M2 +..........+ M« where T is the top event
and Mi are the minimal cut sets.
For determining the minimal cut sets of a fault tree, the tree is first 
represented in equivalent Boolean expression and then either a “top-down” or a 
“bottom-up” substitution method is used. In the section “Evaluate the fault-tree of 
the sensor to assess risk of failure” a “top-down” approach is used to solve the
tree.
After getting the minimal cut set expression for the top event, the absolute 
probabilities of failures of the components are estimated from recent studies and 
substituted in the expression to get the probability of failure of the top event, i.e 
the probability of failure of the sensor system.
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Prototype Development
Like any system development process, a laboratory prototype of the sensor 
system was also developed. In this section, the basic theoretical concepts of 
measuring parameters such as speed, size and count, hardware and software 
used in this prototype are explained.
Methodology
Knowing the time taken to travel a known distance can give the velocity of 
any object, which is also true for velocity measurement of a vehicle. To measure 
the time of travel for the known distance, which is the distance between the 
lasers placed along one side of roadway, the detectors were placed on opposite 
sides of the same roadway and by measuring the time taken by a car to travel 
the distance between the successive lasers the velocity of a car was measured.
Whenever a car came in the path of the laser then the detector could detect 
the car, as the light beam could not reach the detector. With this technique the 
time between the blocking of light emanating from each laser was also 
measured. Also, the measurement of time of residence of a vehicle in the path of 
a beam could help measure the size of the vehicle if the speed of the vehicle 
was known. In this method speed monitoring was different from that used in 
conventional laser guns, where the light is reflected off the license plate or any 
other reflecting surface of the moving vehicle and the velocity is measured by 
Doppler shift, as in laser Doppler velocimetry. In the initial proposed framework,
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shown schematically in Figure 3, two lasers L1 and L2 were placed next to each 
other with a distance of L apart. The two detectors placed on the opposite side of 
the road were D1 and D2.These detectors detected the corresponding beam 
coming to them from the respective lasers, but whenever a vehicle got in the 
path of the line of sight of the beam it was blocked and the detector detected the 
presence of the vehicle. The time.x, between the blocking of light emanating 
from each laser was measured. Velocity, v was measured by dividing the 
distance ‘L’ between the lasers by t which can be represented in equation form
as v =L/t.
Figure 3: Multi-lane highway with moving vehicles V1, V2 and V3. The laser 
velocity measurement unit is comprised of two lasers L1, L2 and two detectors 
D1, D2
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The system that consists of the lasers L1 and L2 and the detectors D1 and D2 
which shown encircled by the dotted curve in Figure 3 was called Laser Velocity 
Measurement Unit (LVMU). Flexibility of adjusting the height of the laser source 
and the detector above the ground surface gave the LVMU a wide range of 
capabilities in measuring various traffic flow parameters. As an example, if both 
the laser source and the detectors were set above a few inches off the ground 
then it could monitor and verify the correctness of the speed measurements.
For multiple lanes, the placement of multiple LVMU was necessary at specific 
places and the optimum number of LVMU’s was determined from the prior 
knowledge of the number of lanes. In the case of multiple lanes one LVMU might 
miss adjacent vehicles in different lanes as both of them might block the two 
beams at nearly the same time, but multiple LVMUs would not miss the adjacent 
vehicles as another LVMU placed in the downrange would be able to distinguish 
the two vehicles. Figure 4 shows the extension of LVMU for a single lane(Figure 
3) in a case of multiple lanes. In general, it was predicted that the number of 
detectors needed to positively identify vehicles in a multi-lane highway was at 
least one grater than the number of lanes. Velocity resolution of the monitoring 
system was the distance between the detectors.
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Figure 4: Detection system simultaneous adjacent vehicles
Effectiveness of the design was tested by setting up a model in the lab based 
on the above theory. Laser diodes as the source of the lasers, photo detector as 
the detector, model cars/trucks as vehicles and model track as roadway were 
used to build the prototype. Lasers were low power, on the order of a few
milliwatts.
As the light beam from the laser source traverses the highway, it was
diffracted. Care was taken to account for this diffraction. To determine the
amount of diffraction, the formula for angle of divergence of a laser beam which 
is 0 -Mtub was employed. In this formula, X is the optical wavelength and to is the 
initial waist 1of the laser beam. For, ro=1mm and X=1 micron, the angle of 
divergence, 0 was approximately 1 mrad. For a three lane highway with lane 
width of 10 feet, the formula gave the beam diameter as 3 mm at the detector
1 The beam waist of a laser beam is the location along the propagation where the beam radius is at 
minimum.
31
which was still smaller to the typical detector area (5 mm x 5 mm), and no 
additional focusing was required.
The effectiveness of the model under inclement weather conditions such as
fog, ambient illumination, and smoke was determined by simulating these 
environmental conditions in the lab. The sensor system was put in a chamber 
filled with fog created by a fog machine. The system was run to take readings of 
speed and at the same time the speed was also calculated manually. The 
probability of failure due to fog was calculated from the number of good
estimation and the number of bad estimations.
Fault-tree analysis and modeling was used to evaluate the reliability of the 
sensors under various conditions and their interactions that might affect its 
reliability. The paths in the fault tree developed for the sensor identified 
sequences and relationship between basic events, which led to the top event. 
The risk was assessed, and based on this result future improvement will be done 
to reduce the risk of failure of the sensor system.
The top event of a fault-tree was a system failure. By using possible undesired 
events such as speed data that was not accurate or no speed data, the system 
was evaluated. All possible events that might led to the top event, such as one 
laser or detector in a LVMU not working, was evaluated. The system was 
improved until a threshold minimum failure probability was achieved with the 
help of iterative procedure. The procedure developed the fault-tree for the 
system, collected data for all possible events, assessed probability, compared it 
with the threshold minimum probability and improved the design if the calculated
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failure probability was higher than the minimum threshold probability, or finalized 
the system if it equaled or was below the threshold.
Hardware
A laboratory prototype of a sensor was developed. This prototype was 
constructed of two laser diodes (LD) and two photo detectors (PD) placed across 
1 lane. Lane width was 40 cm and the distance between the laser-detector pair 
was 20 cm. The laser diodes used in this original prototype was a Radio Shack 
red laser pointer with peak emission at approximately 650 nm while the sharp 
IS456 photo detector used had peak detection at approximately 650 nm. The 
data from the sensor was the output from the photo detector to the Rabbit 2000 
Microcontroller where the data was processed by the execution of the program 
written in Dynamic C, a C like language compatible with the Rabbit 2000 
processor. The program was uploaded to a Rabbit 2000 processor from a 
personal computer through its serial interface by using RS-232 protocol. The 
processed data i.e. the output of the program, then downloaded onto the 
personal computer through the same RS-232 protocol. A schematic of the first 
laboratory prototype is shown below in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Original laboratory prototype of the transmission-based laser sensor.
As the working prototype could calculate vehicle speeds for one lane of traffic, 
a sensor system capable of measuring multiple lanes simultaneously was 
planned. Three laser diodes-photo detector pairs were necessary to build the
sensor and also wireless transmitters and a receiver were introduced to more
realistically simulate field conditions. The laser diode-photo detector pairs were 
installed at a distance of 20 cm apart, which was same as the original one. A 
multiple lane roadway was modeled by using two 40 cm width lanes while 
keeping the width of each lane the same as the original one. Upgraded laser 
diodes were Infrared lasers (model NT57116) with a peak emission at 780 nm
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and upgraded photo detectors were silicon detectors with a peak detection range
of 600 nm to 1000 nm.
RF transmitters with a frequency of 900 MHz manufactured by LINX (model 
TXM-900-HP3-PPS) were connected to the photo diodes. The single RF 
receivers, also with a frequency equal to 900 MHz and manufactured by LINX 
(Model RXM-900-HP3-PPS) were then connected to the Rabbit 2000
Microcontroller and channel selector. The microcontroller was connected to a
personal computer through the same RS-232 connection as the original one. The 
schematic of the sensor for multiple lanes is shown in Figure 6.
SELECTOR
Figure 6: Schematic of the proposed transmission-based laser sensor
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The working sensor prototype developed in the lab had two laser diodes 
(Radio Shack with a peak emission of 650 nm) and two detectors (silicon 
detectors with peak detection angle of 600 nm to 1000 nm) and the schematic of 
this is shown in Fig 9. The wireless component of the sensor had been installed, 
with both the transmitters and the receiver online. Number of vehicles, vehicle’s 
velocity and the size of the vehicles could be measured with good accuracy for 
one lane only. A two lane stretch of roadway had been already modeled but 
placement of more laser diodes-photo diodes along with transmitters need to be 
installed in order to measure speed, count, and size for multiple lanes as 
described in the methodology. Photographs of the developed sensor prototype
and the associated laser diodes and the Rabbit 2000 Microcontroller is shown
below in Figure 7 and in Figure 8.
Figure 7: Current transmission-based laser sensor system, as developed in the 
laboratory.
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Figure 8: Rabbit 2000 TCP-IP Development Kit and laser diodes
Software
A program was written in Dynamic C to measure the traffic parameters based 
on the theoretical concept discussed above .It was uploaded from the personal 
computer through RS232 cable to the Rabbit2000 controller where it was 
compiled and executed taking the input from the receiver. The output of the 
program was sent to the personal computer monitor through the same RS232
cable.
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CHAPTER III
RISK ANALYSIS OF THE SENSOR SYSTEM USING FAULT-TREE
Development a lab prototype of a transmission based laser sensor was first 
objective of this research, which has been explained in the previous chapter. This 
chapter discusses how the sensor system was evaluated. This chapter discusses 
the issues relating to the procedure of building fault-tree for the sensor, of 
collecting data related to the events of fault-tree and finally the method to
estimate the failure risk of this sensor.
System Definition and Fault Tree Construction for the Sensor
This section describes the developed system from a system analyst point of 
view and it also describes the steps of fault tree development of the system. The 
subsection “System Definition” lays out the system’s components and their 
interrelationship while the subsection “Fault Tree Modeling” explains each step of 
the construction of the fault tree for the developed sensor system.
System Definition
Consider Figure 9 below, which shows the laser-detector system that was 
developed and tested along with its transmitter, receiver, processor, computer
and other electronics.
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Figure 9: Schematic of the developed transmission-based laser sensor 
To make a successful fault-tree for this system the operation of different
subsystems, and interaction between different subsystems should be clear. The 
function of this system was to detect a vehicle and to measure its size and 
velocity. Whenever a car came in the path of a laser beam the beam could not
reach to the detector and detector detected that there was a car. The detector
detected the presence of car by identifying a change in the signal. As soon as 
detector detected the change in signal, the transmitter transmitted the change to 
the receiver. The two transmitters associated with the two laser-detector pairs 
sent the signal thorough two different channels and a receiver received the signal 
from the two transmitters by allocating different time slices to different channels. 
The Rabbit 2000 microcontroller connected with the receiver performed the task 
of allocating of time slices to different channels and also it got the information 
about the presence of the car from the receiver as soon as there was a car in the 
path of any of the two laser beams. The software program was uploaded from
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the connected personal computer to the Rabbit 2000 processor where it was 
complied and executed. The processor got the information of the presence of the 
vehicle and also the location (i.e. in the path of which laser beam) and it could 
register the time when this car was detected. With the help of this information the 
processor could calculate the velocity, size and count in the roadway and these 
calculated values were sent back to the personal computer for output.
Fault Tree Modeling
The top undesired event was selected as “System Failure After Start”. It was
assumed that there was no failure in the wire and the limit of resolution of
analysis was set at component failure. Components were those parts of the 
system shown distinctively in the schematic of the system. To make sure that the 
top event was written as fault and it specified a “what” and a “when”. Next the 
test question ’’Can this fault consist of component failure?” was applied. The 
answer was “YES” so an OR-gate was added below the top event and different 
failure modes of the component failure such as primary, secondary and
command modes were considered. In this case however both of the failure
modes were secondary mode and the tree was developed as shown in the 
Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Fault Tree Construction -Step 1
After this, the secondary failure “No data output from output device” was 
considered and after completing this leg of the tree, the other leg related to the 
top event “Error in data” was analyzed. Considering “No data output from output 
device” fault as a component failure an OR-gate was added beneath it and all the 
inputs to the gate were added. Among the inputs were two undeveloped events, 
as it was not possible to get data related to these events .The tree assumed the 
shape as in the Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Fault Tree Construction -Step 2
In considering the secondary failure” No input data to output device”, this event 
could take place because of either a “basic event” or a secondary failure both of 
which were represented as input to an OR-gate that was added below the 
secondary failure” No input data to output device”. The tree so far developed 
assumed the shape shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Fault Tree Construction -step 3
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From here to the rest of the analysis, for clarity and ease of representation 
only the event under consideration was shown with its associated gate below it 
and input events to the gate. The fault event “No output data from processor” 
could consists of a component failure, so all the input events in Figure 13 were 
followed by OR-gate.
Figure 13: Fault Tree Construction -step 4
The event of interest in this stage was the secondary failure “No data input to 
processor” (Figure 14). As the top event in this figure could occur due to any one 
of these input events “No data output from receiver” and “Faulty connection 
between receiver and processor” an OR-gate was added.
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Figure 14: Fault Tree Construction -step 5
Though the reliability of the receiver was high, the chance of failure of 
receivers was very small but still it could happen; and also if no input data comes 
to the receiver from the transmitter, then the receiver would not be able to give 
any data output. These two events were the inputs to the OR-gate added to the 
top event “No data output from receiver” which was shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Fault Tree Construction -step 6
Fault event “No input data to receiver” can consist of a component failure, so 
both the input events in the Figure 16 were followed by OR-gate.
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Figure 16: Fault Tree Construction -Step 7
The secondary failure event “No output data from transmitter” was analyzed 
up to to the point where each of the events was either basic event or 
undeveloped, then the other secondary failure event “weak RF signal” was 
analyzed. The transmitter itself could fail though it got data from a detector which 
could be identified as basic failure event “Transmitter failed”, when it did not work 
under the condition for which it was designed. Also, if the transmitter did not 
receive any data it would fail, which was defined as secondary failure “No input 
data to transmitter”. These two events were input events to an OR-gate that was 
added to the top event “No output data from transmitter” (Figure 17).
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Figure 17: Fault Tree Construction -step 8 
In an attempt to analyze the event “No input data to transmitter” it was
considered as component failure and consequently the OR-gate with its input 
events in Figure 18 is shown.
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Figure 18: Fault Tree Construction -step 9
“No output data from detector” was a component failure and all of the three 
inputs were added to an OR-gate as in Figure 19 .Two of these three inputs 
were secondary failures and they were analyzed separately starting from the left- 
hand event (Figure 20). Notice that this leg reached the terminus (all events are 
either circles or diamond), which represented either basic or undeveloped
events.
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Figure 19: Fault Tree Construction -step 10
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Figure 20: Fault Tree Construction -Step 11
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As the middle component failure event ‘‘weak optical signal” could happen due 
to any one of the three inputs two of which were basic events and the third 
undeveloped, an “OR” gate was added. The signal could be weak in any one of 
these events due to scattering of beams. Instead of focusing on the detector the 
scattered beams could focus somewhere else which made the signal weak 
(Figure 21).
weak optical signal
Figure 21: Fault Tree Construction -Step 12
In analyzing the component failure event “weak RF signal”, it could happen 
due to any one of the three inputs two of which were basic events and the third 
was undeveloped so an “OR” gate was added (Figure 22). This completed the 
right hand leg of the tree whose top event was “system failure after start”. After 
this the left-leg of this tree is discussed.
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Figure 22: Fault Tree Construction -Step 13
The top event of this leg was “ Error in data”. As the top event consists of 
“state-of-system” fault event, an immediate and sufficient cause “Incorrect output 
from program” was added without adding any gate (Figure 23).
Figure 23: Fault Tree Construction -step 14
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The event “Incorrect output from program” was analyzed and as the answer to 
the question asked to this event “Is this event a component failure” was “YES” an 
OR-gate with two inputs was added beneath this event in Figure 24.
Figure 24: Fault Tree Construction -Step 15
The secondary failure added in could cause incorrect output because of 
various delays in the program such as delays due to debouncing of beam, 
channel allocation delay, delays in other electronic devices, and delays which 
might cause incorrect estimation of time interval between successive blocking of 
lasers in the system.
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As “Incorrect output due to delay” was a state-of-system fault event so the 
event “Delay in getting data from receiver” was added directly without any gate in 
Figure 25.
Figure 25: Fault Tree Construction -step 16
“Delay in getting data from receiver” event was a component failure and one 
undeveloped event with one secondary failure event was added to the OR-gate 
that was added to the top event in Figure 26 .The event “Delay in receiver 
sending data to processor” was considered an undeveloped event, as it was not 
possible to assess the probability of happening of this event exclusively because 
in a real scenario, delay occurred due to the combinations of several causal
factors.
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Figure 26: Fault Tree Construction -step 17
The analysis of the event “Delay in getting data from transmitter” up to the 
point where each of the events was either basic or undeveloped event resulted 
the tree in the Figure 27, which also completed the tree-building process of the 
system. In Fig 27 it is seen that all of the leaves consist of undeveloped events, 
which can be justified because of their inherent interrelatedness and complexity 
to assess the individual delay due to that event exclusively.
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Figure 27: Fault Tree Construction -Step 18
The building of this tree is not explained, as it is straightforward and self­
explanatory. Putting all the sub-trees developed in different steps resulted in the 
complete fault-tree of the system that is shown in the Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Fault Tree for the System
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Data collection for risk analysis
Estimation of the probability of the top event to occur, i.e. the sensor system 
failure, required the determination of absolute values of the individual component 
failures. The top event was composed of two types of events explained in the 
next section. The events were basic events represented by circles and 
undeveloped events represented by diamonds. The values of undeveloped 
events could not be assessed as there was not enough information necessary to
calculate the values and the values of these events were assumed as zero in this
study. The values of primary events were attempted to be calculated. The 
primary events related to equipments performance characteristics such as the 
value of P2 or the probability of processor crashes, were collected from the 
equipment vendor and used directly.
An attempt had been made to collect the data of other primary events in lab, 
but it was not possible to create exclusively an experimental condition in lab that 
represents the situation under which the primary event would occur. As an 
example, to find the failure probability caused by “Weak Signal due to Fog” 
event, the sensor system was put in a chamber filled with fog created by a fog 
machine. The system was run to take 100 readings of speed and at the same 
time the speed was also calculated manually using a stop watch. The probability 
of failure was calculated from the number of good estimations and the number of 
bad estimations but it did not yield a good result because, though an attempt was 
made to create fog only to calculate this value, there were other lab conditions 
that also played roles in the systems performance. For this reason the values of
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these primary events were estimated from the recent studies published in well 
known journals such as Society of Optical Engineering (SPIE).
Evaluate the fault-tree of the sensor to assess risk of failure
The purpose of creating a fault-tree for a system is to evaluate the system’s 
failure probability. To determine this probability we needed to evaluate the fault- 
tree of the system. Fault-tree evaluation gave two types of results, qualitative and 
quantitative. The determination of the minimal cut sets, combinations of which 
gave the probability of the top event i.e. the ultimate system failure, required the 
Boolean representation of the tree. The solution of these equations gave the 
combination of basic failure (circles in the Fault-tree) and undeveloped event 
(diamonds in Fault-tree), which equals the top event’s probability. To complete 
this task the fault-tree of the system shown in Figure 28 was represented in the 
reduced form as shown in Figure 29, in which all the primary or basic failures 
were P, all undeveloped events were S, all intermediate failure events were G 
and the final top event was T .The solution of the T contained combinations of S
and P but no G.
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Figure 29: Reduced Fault Tree for the System
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Faults
T - System failure (Top event).
G1- Error in data/wrong output from program.
G2 -No data from output device.
G3- No input data to output device.
G4 -No output data from processor.
G5-No data input to processor.
G6 -No data output from receiver.
G7- No input data to receiver.
G8 -No output data from transmitter.
G9 -Weak RF signal.
G10-No input data to transmitter.
G11- No output data from detector.
G12 -Weak optical signal.
G13- No signal coming to detector / No signal from laser diode.
G14 -Wrong output due to delay/ delay in getting data from receiver.
G15 -Delay in getting data from transmitter.
G16-Delays in getting data in transmitter from detector/Delays in detector in 
detecting.
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Undeveloped
51 - Output device crashes.
52 - No data from output device due to insufficient capacity.
53 - No data from processor due to its insufficient capacity.
54- Weak RF signal due to snow.
55- Weak optical signal due to snow.
56 -Propagation delay.
57 -Delays in detecting due to presence of light and other unavoidable
conditions.
58- Delays in receiver sending data to processor.
59- Delays due to transmitter itself in sending.
S10 - Delays due to detector itself in detecting.
Primary Event/Basic Event
P1 -Faulty connection between Rs-232 cable and devices.
P2 -Processor crashes.
P3 -Faulty connection between receiver and processor.
P4 -Receiver crashes.
P5 -Transmitter failed.
P6 -Faulty connection between detector and transmitter.
P7 -Laser diode crashes.
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P8 -Detector failed in detecting.
P9 - Weak optical signal due to fog.
P10 - Weak optical signal due to rain.
P11 - Weak RF signal due to Fog.
P12 - Weak RF signal due to Rain.
P13 - Incorrect Code.
The equivalent Boolean equations of the tree are as below.
T=G1+G2
G1=P13+G14; G2=S1+S2+G3
G3=G4+P1; G14=S8+G15
G15=S9+G16+S6; G4=P2+G5+S3
G16=S10+S7; G5=P3+ G6
G6=P4+G7
G7=G8+G9
G8=G10+P5; G9=P11+S4+P12
G10=G11+P6
G11=G13+G12+P8
G12=P9+S5+ P10
Starting with the top event, equation substitutions and expansions had been 
done for G’s until T was expressed in terms of minimal cut sets and the final 
expression for T was as below.
T=P1 +P2+P3+P4+P5+P6+P7+P8+P9+P10+P11+P12+P13+S1+S2+S3+S4+
S5+S6+S7+S8+S9+S10
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The values of these individual probabilities were calculated/assumed as follows: 
P1 = 0 (Assumed as we tested the connection and then used it).
P2 =0.0001 (Application engineer of the vendor).
P3 =0(Assumed; as we tested the connection and then used it).
P4 =0.0001 (Application engineer of the vendor).
P5=0.0001 (Application engineer of the vendor).
P6 =0(Assumed; as we tested the connection and then used it).
P7 =0.0001 (From reference given by vendor of laser diode).
P8=0.0001(From reference given by vendor of laser diode).
P9 =Pr (Weak optical signal due to fog)
In calculating the probability of failure due to weak optical signal due to fog 
several recent journal papers have been consulted and the following analysis 
was found. Light propagation thorough atmosphere is affected by absorption and 
scattering, which is called extinction.
The renowned Beer-Lambert law regarding extinction is:
*(X>L) = P (xXV P (X,O) =exp [- y(x) L]
Where
t(x) =total transmittance of the atmosphere at wavelength x-
P(x,L)=signal power at a distance L from the transmitter.
P(x,0)=emitted power.
y(x) = attenuation or the total extinction coefficient per unit length.
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The extinction coefficient depends upon the particle size distribution of the 
fog. The extinction coefficient is calculated based on Mie Scattering theoretical 
model2.
From this model for 650 nm wavelength optical signal the attenuation 
coefficient for both the dense advection and radiation fog (visibility 100 m) was
found as 40/km.
If the probability of failure is defined as 1- t(x,L) then Pr (Failure due to weak 
optical signal in fog) = 1- exp [-(40/100000) *40] =0.015872679 
P10 =Pr (Weak optical signal due to rain)
The Beer-Lambert law for atmospheric attenuation or atmospheric 
transmittance, xa =e’(Pabs +pscat*R .Where pabS and pSCat are the absorption and 
scattering coefficient respectively. R is the optical depth or the length the optical 
signal traversed in atmosphere. This is the same equation as before but in
different form.
For the infrared spectrum pabS negligible as neither nitrogen nor oxygen which 
is the most abundant atmospheric gases have any absorption bands3 
Scattering due to rainfall is wavelength independent as the raindrop size is much 
larger than the wavelengths causing non-selective scattering. Attenuation due to 
rainfall depends upon rainfall rate.
In estimating the attenuation due to rainfall a simulation had been done using 
Simulight software. In this simulation rainfall size distribution was approximated
2 Maher Al Naboulsi and Fre'de'rique de Fornel,”Fog attenuation prediction for optical and infrared waves”, 
society of optical engineering (SPIE), vol.43 No.2, February 2004.
3 Maha Achour,’’Simulating Atmospheric Free-Space Optical Propagation: Part I, Rainfall Attenuation”, 
Proc.SPIE Vol.4635.
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by Weibull distribution and a plot of rainfall attenuation vs. rainfall rate had been 
done 2 From this plot it was found that for rainfall rate 50 mm/hr (average rainfall 
rate) attenuation coefficient pSCat was 8.25 dB/Km. Putting this value in 
atmospheric attenuation equation gave xa = exp[-8.25 *(40/100000)] =0.9967
Same as before the probability of failure due to weak optical signal in Rain
= 1 - Ta
=1-0.9967
= 0.00329
P11 = Weak RF signal due to Fog.
Probability of failure due to weak RF signal transmission in Fog was zero, as 
frequencies below 10GHz were not affected by any weather condition121. 
P12=Weak RF signal due to Rain.
Probability of failure due to weak RF signal transmission in Rain was zero, as 
frequencies below 10GHz were not affected by any weather condition[2]. 
P13=0(Assumed as it is tested carefully).
S1=0(No available data).
S2=0(No available data).
S3=0 (No available data).
S4=0(No available data).
S5=0(No available data).
S6=0(No available data).
S7=0(Hard to determine in laboratory due to its interrelationship with other 
events).
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S8=0(Hard to determine in laboratory due to its interrelationship with other 
events).
S9=0(Hard to determine in laboratory due to its interrelationship with other 
events).
S10=0(Hard to determine in laboratory due to its interrelationship with other 
events).
Putting all these values in equation of T the calculated value of
T = 0.0001+0.0001+0.0001+0.0001+0.0001+0.015872679+ 0.00329
=0.019662679
67
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The developed prototype was tested in lab to measure the performance of 
the system in adverse weather conditions such as fog or smoke. A fault tree 
analysis was conducted to calculate the system’s failure probability. The 
researcher attempted to calculate the probability of failure due to each individual 
primary event by creating the event artificially in lab such as for finding the 
probability of failure due to the event “Weak Signal due to Fog”. The sensor 
system was put in a chamber filled with fog created by a fog machine. But it was 
not possible to create an artificial condition for a event that could give the 
probability of failure due to that event exclusively. As a result the probabilities
were estimated from recent studies related to the events. This estimated failure
probability of the system is 1.966 % giving the system’s availability as 98.034%.
The system design could be improved with more powerful LD and PD pairs. 
Additional testing under a wide variety of adverse weather conditions such as 
rain, snow, and fog with representative laboratory setup should be done to 
assess the system’s failure probability and availability.
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Recommendations
Based on the analysis the following recommendations were made :
(1) Introduce redundancy in the system i.e. include more microprecessor and 
transmitter-receiver pairs to make the system robust against component failure.
(2) Use more powerful LD and PD pairs so that the failure probability due to 
weak signal in adverse weather conditions can be reduced.
(3) Test the system in such a laboratory environment where it would be possible 
to calculate the failure probability of each event separately.
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APPENDIX A - DYNAMIC ‘C’ PROGRAM
IL
;m*(Z9mi±WS-Z9UIi±Pu3)(ieo|j) = auipp 
■H3WI1 3311 =33«nipua
;((£ ‘3aad)iuo«ipwai>nq^
(go si P3[)£H1 qooqo JO A£7=0S3 jnd //
;(o Wo ‘^opBqsHciadtf ‘HaaaWcPAUfa
-------------spoip ojoqd puosss sqj uiojj jbuSis sip saisssj oj siudsjd--------------- //
t{+punoo=punoo
{
{IqBsiq
•00 l/o - W!M»sind= qipiAPSinj}
((£ ‘aaad)iuodP7piai) ji
:o=u
•00l/« + qiP!AVaslnd= ippiAV>spi<i 
Xnpp sui oi//{ti+u=u}(ooz>u)3i;qM
•33WU 3311=<punjpreis
{
• lO'O + WFMOSind= ippiA^spid
}((£ ‘'Haad)iyo<ipH}ia)3iRM
}(l)3IiqM
----------------- psjdrmspn Suisq dojs oi jopspp pjij sip joj peas.-------------- //
^BSjq
((£ "aaacDivodpaqai) ji 
:o=u
•00 l/o + qiP!AV>sind= qipiMPSinj 
Aspp sui oi//{;i+u=u}(oo3>n)3liqM
•H3WI1 3311 = auqivms// 
t>psjq
((£ ‘3aad)ipodp-aiiai)j!
(uo si p3[)iai qooqo jo ao=os3 ind // • (o Wo ‘^opBqsaaad# ‘3aad)iwojJA\.qa
------------spoip opqd isjtj sip uioij jbuSis sqj saisssj oj sjBdsjd---------------- //
•O=HWAV9Sjnjto=^IP«3‘O=^IP^S
} (i) qnM 
} (l)oiFptt
•(oo*o ‘^opBqs33aad^ ‘33aad)iwodJM
uiRip usdo sq ;ou oj sjndpo q pod pB ps //
Keoxo ‘^opBqs^aaad# ‘3aciad)iuojJM 
spdui sb )ssj sip ‘£xb£(pjBoq sip no jo ‘oo) spdpo sb a ^od J° SW 3 JSSMO[ ps //
t0=punoo
t0=9uipp
‘0=u
tqipi^sinjpou
•£9UI!IPU3‘ ^uiimBis^unipuH4 sunjjjBJS Suo{ psuSisun 
Piupp pop 
tifpunos )in
}()uibui
*****♦**♦♦♦♦**♦♦**♦***********♦**♦***♦*♦**♦♦***************♦*♦**♦♦*♦*/
o^pjqouiopXui
**********************************************************************/
while(n<200){n=n+l;}//10 ms delay 
n=0;
if (BitRdPortI(PDDR, 3))
{break;}
}
printf(”count=%d,Size =%f cm,velocity=%f m/s\n”,countl,
PulseWidth*0.6*80000/dtime,80000/dtime);PulseWidth=0;dtime=0;
}//end of second while loop 
} // end of first while loop
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APPENDIX B - OUTPUT FROM A RUN OF THE SENSOR SYSTEM
Dynamic CDist.7.26TS£ -|g|x|
File Edit Compfe Run Inspect Options Window Help
1 | 1 X|Mfel | 1 | Edit 1 Compile) Assembj Regs | Start | J.
jj Start j J 'J $ | ^Dynamic CDist.7.26IS£ Jb___________________ $ 2:00 PH
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